Racism and Responsibility by McWhorter, Ladelle
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy
2008
Racism and Responsibility
Ladelle McWhorter
University of Richmond, lmcwhort@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-
publications
Part of the Inequality and Stratification Commons, and the Race and Ethnicity Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
McWhorter, Ladelle. "Racism and Responsibility." In Difficulties of Ethical Life, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Dennis J. Schmidt,
147-61. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.
Racism and Responsibility 
LADELLE McWHORTER 
Forry years afi:er the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Vvting Rights 
Act and fifty years after the historic Brown v. Board of Education decision, 
members of racial minority groups are still disproportionately disadvan- . 
caged in American society. Despite official civic integration, despite a mas-
sive shift in the terms of public discourse, despite a publicly avowed moral 
and cognitive reorientation on the part of a significant number of whites, 
neighborhoods and schools are more segregated than ever, whites still 
control an overwhelming percentage of this country's wealth and hold a 
virtual monopoly on elite corporate and governmental positions, the dis-
tribution of income and health care is still dramatically unequal, and a 
disproportionate number of people of color live in poverty. 1 Something is 
wrong. But what, exactly? 
Back in the 1950s, when most of these disparities were even greater, 
what seemed to be wrong was that white people had intentionally placed 
barriers in the way of people of color to prevent them from acquiring 
education, jobs, property, or political representation. Afi:er the Civil War, 
blacks had made strides forward politically and economically: some held 
national public office; some had started businesses; many had acquired 
land. Whites took systematic steps at the end of the nineteenth century 
to reverse that trend, inventing elaborate systems of segregation to hamper 
blacks' (and other nonwhites', most notably Native Americans' and Chi-
nese Americans') participation in government and commerce. Some 
whites engaged in these efforts to frustrate minority advancement because 
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they had political and economic interests that were threatened by this new 
source of competition. Perhaps others did so out of resentment over their 
losses in the aftermath of the war. Many probably did so at least in part 
because they believed the scientific theories of the time that suggested that 
minority races were plagued with various forms of physical degeneracy 
that made them prone to disease and crime and thus were potential health 
and safety hazards for whites. Whatever their motives, for the next seven 
decades, whites readily admitted that they wanted such barriers, and as 
minorities challenged them, whites used every means at their disposal to 
maintain them. Under those circumstances, it was easy to account for dis-
parities along racial lines. The obvious culprit was blatant racism. But 
these days, with racist biological theories discredited and generally forgot-
ten,2 with segregation legally dismantled, and with most white people 
agreeing that racial discrimination and racist attitudes are morally wrong, 
how can we account for these stubborn disparities? Could something 
other than racism be the cause? 
I am well aware that even raising this question opens a person to the 
charge of racism, regardless of what answer one ultimately suggests. Many 
people assume that if you ask the question, you have rejected what they 
take to be apparent, namely, that racism is the cause of inequalities and if 
you do not blame racists for it, then the victims-disadvantaged racial 
minorities themselves-must be the ones you blame. Questions of race, it 
seems, almost always lead to judgments of guilt or innocence. Asking 
these questions invites moral discourse, even if one would prefer to engage 
in a discourse of another kind, and it very often also invites moral 'censure. 
That fact-the fact that race cannot readily be discussed outside the 
bounds of what I will call here post-Enlightenment moral discourse-in 
itself seems worth examining. In this essay I want to put forth a suspicion 
that it is this very insistence on keeping questions of racial disparity 
squarely within the boundaries of contemporary moral discourse, securely 
tied to subjective choice and individual responsibility, that prevents us 
from adequately addressing racial injustice and effectively eliminating it. 
Before going further, I should make clear what I mean here by racism. 
I take racism, as discussed and critiqued in race-theory discourses both 
in sociology and in feminist and cultural studies, to be the name of a 
conglomerate of mental phenomena-beliefs, feelings, attitudes, values-
that can motivate acts of racial discrimination and violence. Racism thus 
understood may or may not show itself at any given moment, for though 
it can display itself in utterance or deed, its true residence lies hidden in 
the mind. Consider the classic definition of ethnic prejudice put forth by 
Gordon Allport in 1954: "Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a 
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faulty and inflexible generalization"3-in other words, it is cognitive. And 
likewise a somewhat more-recent definition of racism offered by W. J. 
Wilsoljl: racism is "an ideology of racial domination or exploitation that 
(1) incorporates beliefs in a particular race's cultural and/or inherent bio-
logical inferiority and (2) uses such beliefs to justify and prescribe inferior 
or unequal treatment for that group."4 Some people's racism may be a 
purely cognitive matter; they may believe that it is a verifiable fact that 
people of color are morally or intellectually inferior' to whites. Such people 
have been taught that these claims are true, or they have generalized from 
limited experience. Further experience or empirical evidence can discon-
firm and thus alter their beliefs, and racism can dissipate. However, as 
many researchers have noted, some racism seems not to be amenable to 
alteration on the basis of new evidence. Some racists apparently do not 
hold their racism in the manner of an empirical belief but rather in the 
manner of a metaphysical conviction. Their racist beliefs are merely cog-
nitive expressions of a deep affective orientation to the world. No amount 
of evidence will ever "correct" these "beliefs," and if such people's racism 
does dissipate at some point, they will undergo that dissipation not as a 
change of opinion bur as a conversion experience. Nevertheless, whether 
it is of the first or the second type, racism is a fundamentally mental phe-
nomenon; its source and location is human subjectivity. 
If racism is a mental phenomenon, then the assumption that all in-
stances of racial injustice are the products of racism means that all instances 
of racial injustice are the effects of behavior generated by the mental states 
of individual (usually, though certainly not always, white) people.5 Thus, 
one widely held assumption underlying much of race theory at present is 
that racial injustice persists in our society because individual people make 
it so. Racial injustice, like racism itself, has a subjective origin.6 
Bur what about the fact that most white Americans nowadays claim 
not to harbor any racist beliefs or attitudes? In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, a number of researchers heralded this new disavowal of racism as 
a sign of progress, and it certainly was a change from four or five decades 
before, when whites vociferously avowed racist beliefs. Over time, how-
ever, as the number of avowed racists seemed to decrease much faster than 
the number of nonwhites living in poverty, researchers began to think 
instead that their survey questions were flawed.? Whites really did con-
tinue to harbor racist beliefs and attitudes. They must, otherwise, there 
was no way to account for continued racial injustice.8 Perhaps because of 
widespread moral condemnation of racism, whites were just unwilling to 
say so. The survey questions had to be changed. 
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Researchers Joe Feagin and Hernan Vera found that, indeed, if you ask 
the right questions, white racism will display itself even in subjects who 
at first disavow racist attitudes and values. With some encouragement, 
many white people will make comments that clearly indicate belief in the 
inherent inferiority of people of color, and many more will make ambigu-
ous comments that could be interpreted to indicate such a belief.9 Feagin 
and Vera conclude, "Conviction about some type of white superiority is 
a key part of the racial thinking of many whites."10 
If we accept Wilson's definition of racism, which holds that racist attri-
butions of inferiority may be ascribed to cultural as well as biological fac-
tors, many white respondents are easily classifiable as racist. Lawrence 
Bobo, James R. Kluegel, and Ryan A. Smith found that significant per-
centages of whites believe that blacks are lazy, violent, and unpatriotic 
(among other allegedly negative characteristics), just as in previous dec-
ades. In contrast to the past, however, today's whites typically assert that 
these characteristics are the results of black culture-which they take to 
be monolithic and which supposedly encourages irresponsibility, depen-
dence, and self-indulgence-rather than the results of genetics or racial 
biology. 11 The stereotypes function just as before: whites assume that all 
blacks or most blacks fit them; they make decisions about interaction and 
the distribution of goods in their control on the basis of them; and they 
vigorously oppose government programs designed to offset centuries of 
discrimination as "special rights" or "handouts."12 
It comes as no surprise to me that researchers discover racism among 
white Americans despite the elimination of biological essentialism from 
public discourse. No doubt the repeated sight of solemn, composed civil-
rights marchers confronting savage segregationists did undermine the rac-
ist belief that whites hold a monopoly on dignity and moral rectitude 
among those whose racist beliefs were empirically rather than metaphysi-
cally based. But racist ideologies did not collapse in the 1960s; there was 
no mass conversion experience. All that collapsed at that time was a tacit 
national consensus about how racial difference should be managed. Segre-
gation had failed as a management strategy, and the discourses that per-
meated it had lost credibility as early as 1946.13 White racists could no 
longer assume, as they had for decades, that all whites would assent or at 
least acquiesce to their views baldly stated, so they stopped stating them 
baldly. As some people of color got jobs and took leadership positions 
that enabled them to occupy seats of authority with powers of surveillance 
over whites, that reticence redoubled. To protect one's material interests, · 
one might have to be tight-lipped about race, but that was certainly not 
the same thing as changing one's mind. 
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There are real changes, though. According to researchers like Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva, many white people at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury-perhaps in contrast to most white people twenty-five years earlier-
are not just cynically hiding their racism from researchers, their 
employers, their neighbors, and the courts; when they look at themselves, 
they honestly do not see racism.14 Nevertheless, says Bonilla-Silva in his 
provocatively titled book Racism without Racists, they are racists in fact. 
Bonilla-Silva suggests that many whites m~nage to persist in racism by 
justifying racially biased decisions and discriminatory actions on the basis 
of convictions other than the inherent biological or cultural inferiority of 
nonwhites. Their motive, he holds, is to maintain and benefit from the 
systematic disadvantage of people of color, but their racism is disguised as 
color-blind, abstract liberalism, 15 and it is disguised so well that the whites 
themselves no longer perceive the racism they implicitly espouse. Bonilla-
Silva investigates these mechanisms of disguise and reveals how cognitive 
frameworks like color-blind liberalism really do just recode racist assump-
tions and permit the uninterrupted practice of racism as usual. As he puts 
it, "Whether actors express 'resentment' or 'hostility' toward minorities is 
largely irrelevant for the maintenance of white privilege."16 Racism is alive 
and well. 
Most sociological studies of white racial attitudes seem to assume with 
Bonilla-Silva that white people commit acts that perpetuate racial injus-
tice because they want to maintain a racially unjust political and economic 
system; whether whites admit it or not, we all know at some level that we 
benefit from racial disparities, and the vast majority of us desire to con-
tinue receiving those benefits. Hence we want nonwhites to suffer, not 
because we necessarily believe that they are inferior, although in fact many 
of us do, but because we know that their suffering is a prerequisite for our 
gain. Of course, wanting somebody to suffer who does not deserve to suf-
fer is evil, so the less sure a given white person is that people of color are 
inherently morally inferior, the stronger the incentive is to lie to cover up 
the racism (and the selfishness) that motivates one's decisions and actions. 
In contrast to sociology, however, the race theory coming out of femi-
nist and cultural studies since the mid-1990s-the subfield that has come 
to be called whiteness studies17-does not typically assume that whites 
whose behavior perpetuates racial injustice necessarily want people of 
color to suffer, even indirectly. The discourse of "white privilege" affords 
whiteness-studies theorists a means of reorienting discussion of racial in-
justice away from racism per se and thus of talking about the ways in 
which white people, without actively choosing to hurt people of color, 
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participate in practices that result in racial injustice. 18 Many of these theo-
rists believe that if whites are brought to recognize that such practices are 
unfair to people of color, they will desist and injustice will decrease. 
As far as I have been able to determine, the earliest writings on white 
privilege are those of the feminist theorist Peggy Mcintosh, who pub-
lished papers in 1988 and 1989 entitled "White Privilege and Male Privi-
lege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences through 
Work in Women's Studies" and "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisi-
ble Knapsack," respectively. Mcintosh defines white privilege as "an invis-
ible package of unearned assets"19 analogous to the unearned assets that 
feminists had already begun to call "male privilege." She goes on to list 
forty-six such privileges, from "I can if I wish arrange to be in the com-
pany of people of my race most of the time" to "I can choose blemish 
cover or bandages in 'flesh' color and have them more or less match my 
skin. "20 She does not claim that her list is exhaustive; in fact, she urges 
refinement and extension and changes the list herself in subsequent publi-
cations. She even says that the term privilege is inapt, since "its connota-
tions are too positive to fit the conditions and behaviors which 'privilege 
systems' produce."21 But she continues to use the word, and it has become 
ubiquitous in race studies in the ensuing twenty years, where it has rarely 
received any critique.22 
One white privilege-one Mcintosh does not list (although her inclu-
sion of the availability of so-called flesh-colored bandages points to it) but 
subsequent whiteness-studies theorists have insisted on-is that of be-
longing to a racial group that is taken to be the biological and social norm 
and therefore having no basic experience of specific racial identity. 23 As 
Laurie Fuller puts it, "White people do not conceptualize whiteness as an 
identity. Instead, white people assume that we are really just Americans 
or humans and we don't need to think about being white people because 
white is just the normal, natural way of being human. Race is something 
that describes a quality of African Americans or Asian Americans, not 
white people."24 The first order of business in the project of ending white 
privilege,· the argument goes, is to get white people to experience them-
selves as raced subjects, as members of one race in a multiracial society, 
rather than as the standard from which raced subjects deviate. As the fem-
inist theorist Ruth Frankenberg asserts, "Naming whiteness displaces it 
from the unmarked, unnamed status that is itself an effect of its domi-
nance."25 The first step for white people in recovery from racism is to 
name ourselves white, to confess and own our raced subjectivity. The next 
step is to confront the privileges we have as a consequence of that identity 
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and, having realized the injustice in our continuing to exercise those privi-
leges, divest ourselves of them. 
Mcintosh's discussion of divestiture, which is largely implicit rather 
than explicit in her work, builds on parallels with male privilege. For sex-
ism to decline, men must give up their "unearned assets"-for example, 
the priority they have in university curricula. To study more works by 
women, we must study fewer works by men. Likewise, to study more 
works by people of color, we must study fewer works by whites. If we 
stick with examples of privilege like this one of curricular inclusion-that 
is, with examples that involve allocation of time or goods-divestiture 
makes sense. Things become more complex as soon as we leave the realm 
of the strictly quantifiable, however. For example, how does one divest 
oneself of "privilege" number 5, "I can go shopping alone most of the 
time, pretty well assured that I will not be followed or harassed,"26 or 
"privilege" number 23, "I can criticize our government and talk about 
how much I fear its policies and behavior without being seen as a cultural 
outsider"?27 One cannot simply agree to bear a greater share of store 
clerks' harassment so that an Mrican American shopper ~can bear less, and 
one surely should not forgo the right, indeed the responsibility, to criticize 
our government just because an Asian American might be ostracized for 
doing so.28 The language of privilege does not work here, and the strategy 
of divestiture, even if feasible, could conceivably allow more racial injus-
tice than it alleviates. Nevertheless, within whiteness studies divestiture is 
the strategy of choice.29 1t finds its most radical expression in the writings 
of the self-styled race traitors Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey, who hold 
that the very racial identity that enables one to lay claim to privilege must 
be eschewed. "The key to solving the social problems of our age is to 
abolish the white race. "30 Whiteness is privilege, they claim, so the only 
morally responsible option is to divest oneself of one's white racial iden-
tity entirely by refusing all the privileges associated with whiteness.31 
Quite apart from the practical questions these strategies for ending ra-
cial injustice might raise-and they raise a great many-is the more fun-
damental question of whether racial injustice necessarily originates in 
subjectivity in the first place. To use terms taken from Michel Foucault, 
subjectivities may be the anchor or relay points for power, but they may 
not be the sovereign origins of it. In fact, they may themselves be products 
of that same network of power. Ignatiev and Garvey come close to this 
idea when they maintain that racial identities are historically constructed, 
but they seem to assume that subjectivity itself is not. White racial iden-
tity, in their view, appears to be something that an otherw-ise neutral given 
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subject assumes and can, with effort, refuse. But in fact, as careful atten-
tion to the real advantages that most whites have over most people of 
color in the United States clearly shows, divestiture is not an option. 
Some of the most important advantages are not things at all-not land or 
stocks and bonds or oil wells, although such things are very important 
and their unfair distribution must be addressed. The most important 
"things" are, for example, having developed one's bones and brains in a 
house or apartment in a part of the world relatively free of toxic substances 
like lead and mercury, 32 having grown up with literate elders who had the 
leisure time to pursue intellectual or artistic or political interests, having 
developed as a personality in a society in which others, even most strang-
ers, clearly believe one's life to be precious and one's suffering to be mis-
fortune. These and many other "white privileges" are not things any of 
us lucky enough to have had them can give up, for the simple reason that 
they are now us-our bodies, our psyches, our intellects, our self-esteem. 
And what is wrong is not that we have had these things; it is that many 
others have not had and do not have and will not have these things unless 
something pretty drastic is done.33 
But fifty years of moral condemnation of racism has done nothing that 
drastic. In fact, it has done virtually nothing at all, other than prevent 
people from analyzing racial injustice as a systemic problem that shapes 
our society and our selves long before any one of us ever becomes a moral 
agent of any sort, let alone a racist. Hence, I propose that we abandon the 
rhetoric of sin and sacrifice, and with it the strategy of divestiture-in 
fact, I would like to propose that we abandon the language of skin privi-
lege altogether since it tends to obscure the ways in which subjectivities 
are formed in networks of power-and study race in much the same way 
that Foucault has studied sexuality, as a dispositif, as an apparatus of bio-
power with a specific history. Doing so, I believe, will do more to disrupt 
unjust racial power arrangements, including racial subject positions, than 
any critique of skin privilege ever could. 
As we all know from Foucault's analyses, biopower arose in the nine-
teenth century; race and racism preexist its advent. But a good genealogy 
will show that race was transformed in the nineteenth century and ab-
sorbed into biopolitical discourses and practices in much the same way 
that many other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century disciplinary prac-
tices and identities were. Space does not permit a thorough genealogy of 
race here, but I will offer a brief sketch derived from the recent work of 
several U.S. historians, as well as from Foucault himself. 
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Although the word race first appeared in English in 1580,34 Foucault 
argues that both the concept of race as a specifically human form of differ-
entiation and political discourses of race and racism emerged in the seven-
teenth century. At that time a new discourse, one Foucault calls a 
discourse of"race war," enabled an English underclass to distinguish itself 
from its rulers and critique its government and laws.35 The claim that the 
rulers were of an alien (Norman) race and that their laws were simply a 
means of conquest and ongoing oppression (of a Saxon race) served to 
constitute that underclass in their own eyes as a distinct people and to 
rally them for revolution. This discourse was easily adapted for other pur-
poses, however, and so it had widespread currency in a variety of forms 
all 'across the political spectrum in ensuing decades. 36 
In early uses of the concept, race was not primarily a morphological 
phenomenon. Races were distinct because of their distinct lineages, cus-
toms, languages, or values and perhaps their distinct characters or reli-
gious beliefs. A major transformation in the concept of race occurred 
when the word ceased 'to name distinctions between cultural or linguistic 
communities and came to be applied only to morphologically distinguish-
able groups (whose members might not share a language or culture or 
even a geographical region). Foucault calls this transition a "biological 
transcription,"37 meaning that race was thereafter considered fundamen-
tally a heritable physical trait. However, since the word biological sounds 
scientific and Foucault later distinguishes what he calls "scientific racism" 
from the racism associated with this earlier concept, I would prefer to call 
this a morphological transcription instead. By the late eighteenth century, 
this morphological transcription having taken place, race was primarily 
about bodies, not language or custom or political history. Foucault corre-
lates this event with "nationalist movements in Europe and with national-
ities' struggles against the great State apparatuses (essentially the Russian 
and the Austrian)" and with colonization.38 
In the Anglo colonies of North America, race was deliberately intro-
duced at the beginning of the eighteenth century as a means of dividing 
and disempowering a labor force. In The Invention of the White Race: The 
Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America, the historian Theodore 
Allen asserts that neither race nor racism as we know them existed in colo-
nial America in the seventeenth century. What did exist in abundance was 
the horrific exploitation of laborers, especially in the tobacco colonies, as 
planters grabbed up land faster than labor could be imported into a 
marshy death trap where most workers perished within three years of ar-
rival. Most laborers in the early years were indentured servants, meaning 
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that they worked for some specific length of time agreed to by contract 
(usually-unless they were simply liquored up and kidnapped or, as hap-
pened with orphans, stolen off the streets of London and "apprenticed" 
to planters or, as happened with many young women, purchased from 
impoverished parents). If they survived their term of indenture-very 
many did not-and managed to hang on to their indenture papers· and 
convince their "employers" to go with them to court to have the term of 
contract officially terminated (this did not happen automatically), then 
they were entitled to freedom dues, which consisted of a certain number 
of acres of land and a set of tools to start their own plantations. Prior to 
the end of their term of service, indentured servants could be sold by their 
masters. Indeed, indentured servants were regularly traded as chattel. But 
they were not chattel for life-unless their lives happened to be prema-
turely curtailed. As the years wore on, enough indentured servants sur-
vived to acquire land that there was a glut of tobacco on the market. For 
that reason and others, prices fell. It was clear to the wealthy that freedom 
dues had to be avoided; there was no room for more producers and plenty 
of need for more labor~ Upward mobility had to cease. 
British law clearly forbade lifetime chattel servitude. Men could be 
bought and sold, made to work for free, confined against their will, and 
beaten almost to death, but they could not be made to suffer all these 
things for their entire lives. (Things were slightly different for women; as 
wives, women could be bought outright, forced to work for free, confined, 
and beaten for their entire lives. Why were they not considered slaves? 
Because British law prohibited husbands from reselling them after the ini-
tial purchase.) Colonial planters began to find ways around British law. 
Allen puts the number of European men, women, and children brought 
to Virginia and Maryland between 1607 and 1682 at 92,000, of which 
more than 75 percent were made to be, in fact if not in law, lifelong chat-
tel slaves in the tobacco colonies.39 
But they did not take to it kindly. Allen documents hundreds of inci-
dents of resistance and rebellion. The entire colonial labor force was ex-
tremely unruly and quite apt to act with solidarity across what we now 
perceive as raciallines.40 European, African, and Native American bond-
laborers often escaped together, sometimes seeking asylum in nearby Na-
tive American communities, where they were welcomed. Many chose to 
fight rather than run, however, and racially mixed groups of militant la-
borers menaced planters throughout the seventeenth century, cooperating 
with each other apparently without racial discord. 
How could planters bring such a large and volatile labor force under 
their control? And how could they prevent the planting class from ex-
panding as bond-laborers earned their right to land and market share? The 
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easiest way was to stop importing so many European bond-laborers whose 
rights were recognized and sometimes enforced by European govern-
ments. Native Americans were not optimal slave material, since their 
knowledge of the land and kinship ties with neighboring groups made 
escape a constant possibility. But Africans, strangers in the New World 
without Old World governments to protect their rights, could be used 
indefinitely, with no freedom dues ever paid. After the British chartered 
the Royal Africa Company in 1667 to exploit their newly acquired access 
to the African coasts following the Second Dutch War, the supply of vul-
nerable Africans seemed endless. 
Slavery, then, was not at first a racist institution in North America (al-
though obviously it was an unjust and oppressive one). Nor was racism 
characteristic of the general population of laborers in Anglo-America in 
the seventeenth century. Racism was invented to persuade laborers of Eu-
ropean descent not to act in solidarity with, and to accept the lifelong 
enslavement of, African laborers. This was no easy feat; after all, the life-
long enslavement of any group ran counter to the economic interests of 
alllaborersY Therefore, Allen claims, the colonial goverpments of the to-
bacco colonies-acting independently of the British government-
deliberately drove an ideological wedge between laborers of African and 
European descent, and the U.S. government continued this policy in the 
late eighteenth century. This was done systematically not by degrading 
chattel slaves (which would have been difficult, considering how degraded 
they already were) but rather by lowering the legal status of free laborers 
of African descent and elevating that of free laborers of European descent. 
This is how, according to Allen, the so-called white race was created. It 
was established as a legal and economic category in colonial and then in 
U.S. law and policy as a way of co-opting the European American portion 
of the labor force so that enslavement of a subset of the total labor force-
the African American portion-could proceed unhampered. 
When it revised the Virginia Code in 1705, the Virginia General As-
sembly enacted a number of new laws that changed the civil status of free 
African Americans, differentiating them for the first time from free Euro-
pean Americans. In addition to making these changes, the General As-
sembly, as Allen says, "took special pains to be sure that the people they 
ruled were propagandized in the moral and legal ethos of white-suprema-
cism,"42 pains they persisted in taking with the enactment of more such 
laws over the next two decades. Allen describes the new rules in detail: 
For consciousness-raising purposes (to prevent "pretense of igno-
rance"), the laws mandated that parish clerks or churchwardens, 
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once each spring and fall at the close of Sunday service, should read 
("publish") these laws in full to the congregants. Sheriffs were or-
dered to have the same done at the courthouse door at the June or 
July term of court. If we presume, in the absence of any contrary 
record, that this mandate was followed, we must conclude that the 
general public was regularly and systematically subjected to official· 
white-supremacist agitation. It was to be drummed into the minds 
of the people that, for the first time, no free African-American was 
to dare to lift his or her hand against a "Christian, not being a negro, 
mulatto or Indian" {note here that in 1705 the Virginians had as 
yet no way to refer to "white people"}; that African-American free-
holders were no longer to be allowed to vote; that the provision of a 
previous enactment was being reinforced against the mating of En-
glish and Negroes as producing "abominable mixture" and "spuri-
ous issue"; that, as provided in the 1723 law for preventing freedom 
plots by African-American bond-laborers, "any white person {and 
notice here, eighteen years later, the use of the term white} ... found 
in the company with any [illegally congregated] slaves" was to be 
fined (along with free African-Americans or Indians so offending) 
with a fine of fifteen shillings, or to "receive, on his, or her, or their 
bare backs, for every such offense, twenty lashes well laid on."43 
Obviously, if Americans of European descent already considered Afri-
can Americans their inferiors, discriminated against them, refused to asso-
ciate with them, and ignored their interests and needs, no such policy of 
public recitation would have been necessary-nor would many of the laws 
recited have been necessary. The point was to produce racial division 
where little or none existed and to do so in order to control the labor 
force and thus allay elite fears of a general uprising and a destabilization 
of the colonial economy. 
The general laboring population was not the only group who had to 
be taught the lessons of morphological racism by colonial governmental 
officials. In 1723, after the Virginia General Assembly drastically curtailed 
basic civil rights for free blacks,44 the British attorney general Richard 
West launched an inquiry. Denying anyone the right to vote in any colo-
nial election on the basis of skin color was a clear departure from English 
law and from previous colonial statutes. West wrote, "I cannot see why 
one freeman should be used worse than another, merely upon account of 
his complexion."45 In response, colonial governor William Gooch ex-
plained that free Negroes and mulattoes tended to be sympathetic to 
slaves, many having previously been slaves themselves. Recent uprisings of 
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slaves in which black freeholders had participated made that fact obvious. 
Therefore the governor thought it wise to affix to them "a perpetual 
Brand ... by excluding them from that great Privilege of a Freeman."46 
Gooch was no racist; he did not believe that blacks were inferior to whites. 
He simply wanted to limit freeholders' support of slave rebellions. Race 
hatred was not the fundamental reason for new racial distinctions in law. 
The basic reason was strategic: the easiest way to contain people who, 
because of their personal affiliations and histo'ries, could not be supposed 
to support the current and quite profitable organization of colonial labor 
was to create law that marked them permanently as an underclass and 
distanced them from other laborers who might otherwise share their 
interests. 
Contrary to tradition and legal precedent, colonial governments delib-
erately established morphological race as a civil concept. Over the course 
of the eighteenth century, race, a form of embodiment, became a form of 
subjectiviry-of citizenship, of social status, and finally of personal iden-
tity. By Thomas Jefferson's day, race was no longer a matter of lineage or 
culture at all; it was simply a matter of morphology-skin color, hair tex-
ture, facial structure-along with the internal physiology that was thought 
to attend such variations, including increased or decreased capacity for 
rational thought. What had once been a political scheme had become 
within sixty years a kind of common sense. Law and policy in the new 
United States would thus be based on the assumption that racial subjec-
tivity is real, that members of the black and red races are incapable of 
exercising the responsibilities of full citizenship in a free republic, and that 
lifelong servitude is appropriate for some races but inappropriate for 
others. 
However, morphological race in the late eighteenth century was not, 
strictly speaking, a scientific concept; it was not until the middle of the 
nineteenth century that race became fully integrated into biological 
thought. Foucault writes, "At the time when the notion of race struggle 
was about to be replaced by that of class struggle ... it was in fact only 
natural that attempts should be made by one side to recode the old 
counterhistory not in terms of class, but in terms of races-races in the 
biological and medical sense."47 The ruling classes took over the morpho-
logical concept of race, reworked it with the aid of evolutionary theory, 
and deployed it to offset the discourse of class that was developing in the 
years immediately preceding and following the revolutions of 1848. Now 
race became a question of "differentiation of species, natural selection, 
and the survival of the fittest."48 The various races were subspecies that 
had developed along different lines in response to different environmental 
pressures; consequently, they had differing capacities and vulnerabilities 
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that made each one more or less likely to develop at an acceptable rate 
toward that nineteenth-century Western ideal, "civilization." 
Nineteenth-century U.S. policy regarding indigenous peoples and 
those peoples whose ancestors had been imported against their will re-
flected this view that there was one and only one ideal of human develop-
ment and that various racial types could be judged against that ideal and 
the norms of development toward it. In other words, U.S. policy coa-
lesced with the techniques of power and knowledge that Foucault has fa-
mously labeled "normalization." The Bureau oflndian Affairs undertook 
a number of programs to force Native Americans to abandon their tribal 
practices, to assimilate to white American culture, insofar as possible to 
develop into white people.49 Under this view, Native Americans were 
merely retarded compared with whites and might be brought along with 
the proper management strategies, but African Americans were irrevers-
ibly abnormal. Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century scientists claimed 
that African Americans were degenerate as a race and prone to alcoholism, 
venereal disease, insanity, and idiocy; segregation practices and laws were 
established in great part to prevent the spread of black contagion to white 
blood. 5° U.S. immigration policy in the first half of the twentieth century 
clearly reflects the view that members of allegedly less developed races 
were a biological threat to white Americans. 51 As Foucault puts it, writing 
about We~tern Europe during the same period, "Thanks to the shift from 
law to norm, ... sovereignty was able to invest or take over the discourse 
of race struggle and reutilize it for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus 
becomes the imperative to protect the race"52-the white race, that is. 
And the enemy of the normalizing state is deviance in all its forms. 
The nineteenth- and twentieth-century discourses of race that devel-
oped out of biological accounts of normality and closely allied anthropo-
logical accounts of progress toward civilization hold up the white race as 
the standard from which all other races deviate. Racial identities are devi-
ant identities, just as the sexual identities that Foucault lists are-
"mixoscopophiles, gynecomasts, presbyophiles, sexoesthetic inverts," and 
so on. 53 The outcasts in Western societies of the twentieth century are 
always figured as deviants in their very truth as selves. Within those socie-
ties, racial difference has become part of a general discourse of norm and 
deviance, part of the growing network of power that uses normalization 
to control populations. It is no accident that throughout the twentieth 
century race was thoroughly sexualized and sex was very often overtly ra-
cialized. Racial and sexual identities as we know and live them now, in · 
contrast to those of two hundred years ago, are products and tools of nor-
malization and biopower.54 
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Just as Foucault's genealogy of sexuality can help loosen the hold that 
sexual identities have over us and lessen the compulsion to confess and 
c~:mform to sexual networks of power, genealogies of race can expose racial 
categories and identities as formations of power and through that expo-
sure change our relationship to them, to each other, and to ourselves. 
Genealogy is not a self-sacrificial strategy of divestiture; it is an antinor-
malizing discipline that engenders movements of self-overcoming opening 
toward fundamental transformation in subjectivity and social practice. As 
genealogy reveals the porosity of the past, it reopens the future. As it ex-
poses the accidents that constitute norms, it frees difference from the con-
fines of deviance. Genealogy as a practice is part of an ethos, a way of 
living that resists and counters normalization. It is an antinormalizing 
discipline. 
If we are serious about ending racial injustice, simply passing moral 
judgment on normalized subjectivities is futile. The institutions that 
shape every aspect of our lives carry racist values within them. No one can 
successfully resist the repetition of those values in our society and in our 
lives by simply refusing "skin privilege" or by renouncing white identity. 
The solution to racial injustice is not moral and person-al; it is political 
and systemic. But moral discourse, focused on sovereign individuals as the 
origins of evil, blocks any progress in that direction. What we need instead 
is an ethos that includes countermemory-genealogical archival research 
combined with local accounts of living race differendy55-an ethos that 
fosters our capacities without increasing our docility and thus unfits us for 
normalization. We need an ethos that creates the conditions under which 
we might eventually be able to disrupt and thoroughly undermine the 
normalizing institutions that perpetrate the racial injustice that so very 
many of us do not want in our society anymore. 
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